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One of the most controversial arguments in the context of Scotland’s referendum on independence is the
issue of whether an independent Scotland could make a seamless transition to EU membership
and under what terms it would be able to join. Daniel Kenealy writes that while the issue has been
the subject of bitter disagreements between the Yes and No campaigns, the reality is that most of
the key uncertainties are simply impossible to resolve until after the referendum.
On 15 July, Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission president-elect, made a statement to
the European Parliament in which he announced a freeze on EU enlargement for the term of his
presidency. Within hours his words had become weapons in the armoury of Better Together, the
campaign for Scotland to remain in the UK in the upcoming Scottish independence referendum.
Here, they said, was further proof that an independent Scotland would be outside of the EU. Nicola Sturgeon quickly
rebutted arguing that Better Together had ‘grossly distorted’ Mr Juncker’s comments. The final twist came as a
spokesperson for Mr Juncker made it clear that he was referring only to those countries currently listed as candidate
countries (Albania, Montenegro, FYR of Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey, Iceland). This was, in the context of the
referendum, a particularly small storm in a rather small teacup.
It is regrettable, although unsurprising, that Mr Juncker’s words triggered off such a series of claims and counter-
claims. Instead of digesting his words and thinking them through carefully and critically, Better Together was ready,
on a coiled spring, to leap into action with a standard pre-scripted narrative about how a vote for independence
would create uncertainties. To be clear the pro-independence camp are little better. Although accepting that EU
membership for an independent Scotland could not be automatic there remains a stubborn refusal to honestly
discuss the practical difficulties inherent in Scotland’s transition to full Member State status. The Scottish
Parliament’s European and External Relations Committee (full disclosure, I was expert adviser to that committee)
gathered what I believe to be the most comprehensive set of evidence on the topic to date. Yet, regrettably, the
committee report fell victim to the politics of the referendum with numerous divisions, dissents, and questions
concerning its legitimacy.
The issue has become nothing more than grist to the mill of two campaign meta-narratives. For Yes Scotland the EU
is – along with the pound sterling, the Queen, and the various other forms of shared assets that the SNP claim will
be retained – one of the many structures in which an independent Scotland will continue to be embedded. It thus
serves as a symbol of continuity. For Better Together the EU issue represents little more than another element of
uncertainty and risk. We are stuck in a cycle of competing statements, each serving a political meta-narrative. My
colleague Professor Charlie Jeffery has written about the politics of these strategies here.
A more sensible and informed examination of the question would lead to the conclusion that there are few
certainties. Amongst those certainties are that first, EU membership for an independent Scotland will not be
automatic because, as a minimum, the existing treaties will need to be amended. Second, irrespective of the legal
mechanism (on which Graham Avery offers a neat summary here) through which an independent Scotland joins the
EU, all 28 EU Member States would hold a veto.
Third, Scotland is not ‘fully compliant’ with the EU’s acquis (the body of common rights and obligations binding on all
Member States). At present Scotland is, in several key areas, only compliant by virtue of being part of the UK and
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thus covered by the UK’s institutions and regulatory
structures. Finally, the timetable of eighteen months
(between a referendum on 18 September 2014 and a
proposed independence day of 24 March 2016) remains
an optimistic one.
A little more can be added to these points. It is crucial to
understand that the EU generates a whole host of
reciprocal rights and obligations between its Member
States and its citizens. The notion that these can be
suddenly severed without generating severe economic
dislocation is nonsensical. The overriding priority for all
Member States, in the event of Scotland voting for
independence, will be to avoid any hole emerging in the
existing single market. Failure to do so would, as Sir
David Edward has pointed out, lead to uncertainty and
chaos for all non-UK EU citizens living, working, and
studying in Scotland and EU companies doing business
in Scotland.
It has been commonly asserted that the Spanish – given the situation in Catalonia – would use their veto to send a
message to domestic constituents. Whilst this cannot be ruled out, Spanish government officials have said they
would not interfere. Furthermore, to suggest that the Spanish government would act on a single motive is to over-
simplify politics. Just as important in their calculations would be the fate of their citizens in Scotland and their
fishermen in Scottish waters.
Following a vote for independence, it seems clear that David Cameron would be asked to brief his colleagues at the
next European Council meeting he attended. Part of that briefing would, most likely, include a proposal for how to
handle Scotland’s transition. The precise legal mechanism through which this would be done is a second-order
question. It is the politics that counts. And the politics of the negotiations would be very complicated. Scotland’s EU
partners would be entitled to ensure that the institutions of the new Scottish state were in place and sufficiently
robust to ensure EU regulations and laws were fully implemented. And the Scottish Government would want to
ensure that it got the best membership deal for its citizens.
The Scottish Government, according to their White Paper and supplementary EU paper, would seek to retain all of
the special provisions and opt-outs currently enjoyed by the UK. It is highly unlikely that all of these would be
secured. The impracticality of erecting an internal border within the British Isles suggests that an opt-out on
Schengen – thus allowing Scotland to remain within the long-established Common Travel Area – would be
forthcoming.
A formal opt-out on the euro (currently enjoyed by only the UK and Denmark) is less likely. The signal that such an
opt-out would send at a time when the Eurozone remains fragile is unlikely to be welcomed by many Member
States. Yet, as my colleague Drew Scott has rightly observed, even without a formal opt-out a state cannot be
forced to join the single currency. Then there’s the UK’s much despised budget abatement (commonly called ‘the
rebate’). The notion that Scotland would be able to negotiate for itself a share of the UK’s abatement and a
continuation of that practice into the future is highly doubtful. The bottom line on the opt-outs thus may end up being:
a concession to Scotland on Schengen; a fudge for Scotland on the euro; and a price to be paid by Scotland on the
rebate.
These are just some of the issues that would have to be resolved by Scotland and its EU partners. Indeed, many
issues (e.g. currency arrangements, shared regulatory frameworks) would have to be resolved between Scotland
and the government in London before the EU could truly engage. And then whatever deal is reached has to be
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ratified in each of the 28 Member States. Thus the eighteen-month timescale is highly ambitious.
Consider that the most rapid completion of the accession process to date was the 1995 enlargement in which
negotiations were completed in thirteen months with ratification taking a further ten months. It would thus be
advisable for all sides to start thinking about appropriate bridging arrangements. I have little doubt that an
independent Scotland will take its place in the EU, but the precise terms remain less certain and the likelihood of it
being able to do so at the moment of its independence is quite unlikely.
As far as the politics of the referendum are concerned the EU issue remains, as my colleague Jan Eichhorn and I
have argued, one that neither divides nor animates voters. It’s probably time to leave the issue alone as no further
clarity can be brought to it before 18 September.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1tojEmA
 _________________________________
About the author
Daniel Kenealy – University of Edinburgh
Daniel Kenealy is Lecturer and Deputy Director at the University of Edinburgh’s Academy of
Government. He was expert adviser to the Scottish Parliament European and External Relations
Committee on their recent inquiry into the EU aspects of independence.
3/3
